ECAP 6: Workshops
The following workshops will be offered during the conference (for details see below):
1. Formal Methods in Philosophy
2. Structured Meanings and Concepts
3. Beyond Minimalism
4. Metaphysics and Its Methods
5. Kinds of Value and Kinds of Value Bearers
Formal Methods in Philosophy
organised by Stephan Hartmann (Tilburg University) and Hannes Leitgeb (Bristol University)
Speakers
Pascal Engel (Geneva University): Formal methods in philosophy: shooting right without collateral damage
Igor Douven (K.U. Leuven): Simulating Peer Disagreements
Wlodek Rabinowicz (Lund University): Modelling Presumption of Equality
Hannes Leitgeb (Bristol
University): Formal Methods in Semantics and Metaphysics
Thomas Müller (Utrecht University): Formal Methods in Philosophy of Science
Day 4, August 24th, Buiding C (Auditorium Maximum), Large Lecture-Hall B
Timetable:
14:30 - 15:00 Hannes Leitgeb
15:00 - 15:30 Igor Douven
15:30 - 16:00 Thomas Müller
16:00 - 16:30 Wlodek Rabinowicz
16:30 - 17:00 coffee break
17:00 - 17:30 Pascal Engel
17:30 - 18:20 general discussion
Workshop description:
At present, formal philosophy, i.e., the application of mathematical and
logical methods to philosophical questions, is booming again:
philosophical notions and claims are formulated within formal frameworks
such as probability theory, the theory of belief revision, non-classical
and modal logics, and formal theories of truth; philosophical arguments
are supported by mathematical proofs that connect philosophical
assumptions to philosophical conclusions; and philosophical theories are
developed in the style of applied mathematics. Where does this revival of
formal methods in philosophy derive from? What has changed since the
heydays, and the decline, of formal methods in Logical Empiricism? Are
there any limits of formalization in philosophy, and does the new
mathematical turn pose any risks? This workshop deals with such questions
by presenting recent applications of formal methods in philosophy of
science, epistemology, semantics, metaphysics, ethics, and value theory,
and by scrutinizing their relevance to modern philosophy.
Structured Meanings and Concepts
organised by Pavel Materna (Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic; Masaryk University in Brno) and Marie Duží (VSB-Technical University of Ostrava)
Speakers
Bjørn Jespersen (Delft University of Technology):
Genuine Structured Meanings
Marián Zouhar (Slovak Academy of Sciences):
Structured Propositions and Propositional Radicals
Peter Pagin (Stockholm University):
On the reasons for structured meanings
Peter Schroeder-Heister (University of Tübingen): Definitional reasoning and semantic structure
Day 4, August 24th, Building C (Auditorium Maximum), Medium Lecture-Hall A
Timetable:
9:00 – 10:00 Marie Duží, Pavel Materna
10:00 – 11:00 Peter Pagin
11:00 – 11:30 coffee break
11:30 – 12:30 Bjørn Jespersen
12:30 – 15:00 lunch
15:00 – 16:00 Marián Zouhar
16:00 – 17:00 coffee break
17:00 – 18:00 Peter Schroeder-Heister
Workshop description:
Marie Duží, Pavel Materna: „Structured Meanings and Concepts”
A terminological clarification is necessary: We accept the general core of Frege’s theory, viz. that there are two semantically relevant relations: denoting and expressing. While Frege’s Sinn and Bedeutung may be (and have been) translated as sense and meaning the contemporary use of the term meaning corresponds rather to what Frege meant by Sinn, and as for Bedeutung we can accept Church’s denotation (rather than reference, see below).
I. Semantic theories of meaning are either set-theoretical or procedural theories. The broadly accepted interpretation of Frege’s Sinn (and so of meaning), i.e., interpretation according to which meanings are intensions, is a typical set-theoretical theory if intensions are modelled as functions (mappings) from possible worlds (PWS intensions). Set-theoretical conceptions can be criticized from the viewpoint of our intuitions concerning meaning:
A. Coarse-grained analyses
a) Mathematical case: Mathematical expressions do not express intensions, or the intensions expressed by mathematical expressions are constant functions. Thus all mathematical true statements are equivalent and the distinction between their meanings is beyond the expressive power of set-theoretical conceptions.
b) Empirical case: Empirical expressions may be connected with the same intension but obviously possess distinct meanings. Thus, individuation of meaning is restricted to equivalence. This is the tightest restriction possible in any modal intensional semantics whose intensions are extensionally individuated, since equivalent formulas are indistinguishable.
B. Set-theoretical conception of meanings cannot render the structure of sense expressed by an expression. (A consequence of A.)
Sets are simple, i.e., not structured. Functions as mappings are sets. In the schema that represents a function F with inputs and outputs no correspondences between the parts of the schema and the subexpressions of the expression who’s meaning F should be can be detected. A consequence: compositionality in terms of such a meaning could not be defined.
C. Understanding as knowledge of meaning
It is commonly admitted that we understand expressions iff we know their meanings. To know the meaning of an expression if meanings are (PWS) intensions would mean to know a function from possible worlds, which is surely hardly thinkable.
D. Denotation should be unambiguously determined by meaning
In the empirical case this principle (intended but not realized by Frege) would not hold if meaning were an intension: The value of the intension in the actual world-time would be then the denotation but it would be no more determined by logical analysis only – this value can be determined only via experience.
II. Solution offered by Transparent Intensional Logic
Meanings are abstract procedures (defined as constructions) that are encoded due to linguistic convention by expressions of the given language. Denotations are objects (if any) that are constructed by the meanings. Thus denotations are unambiguously determined by meanings. Empirical expressions denote intensions, so the meanings of empirical expressions construct intensions but not, of course, their contingent values in the actual world-time: these values (to be determined empirically) are not denotations but references.
III. Concepts
Aristotelian concepts (as definitions or Definiens) are in general structured but not in the sense of algorithmically structured procedures.
Bolzano’s concepts are abstract entities whose structure is relevant.
Frege’s concepts are sets (characteristic functions of classes). (So there can be no two distinct concepts of a class!)
Church: A generalization of Bolzano: Every meaningful expression expresses a concept. A possibility of procedural conception is open: a concept is what is shared by lambda-convertible expressions.
TIL: Concepts are closed constructions modulo alpha- and eta-reduction.
To understand an expression E means thus to know the procedure that is encoded by E (not necessarily to know the result of the construction, not necessarily to be able to execute the procedure).
Problems connected with the set-theoretical conceptions of meanings/concepts are solved.
Beyond Minimalism
organised by Filip Buekens (Tilburg University/TILPS)
Speakers
Leon Horsten (Bristol University): Inferential Deflationism
Filip Buekens (Tilburg University/TILPS) Truth as an Explanatory Concept
Martin Fischer (University of Leuven): Deflationism and Reducibility
Day 4, August 24th, Building C (Auditorium Maximum), Large Lecture-Hall B
Timetable:
9.00-9.40 Martin Fischer
9.40-9.50 break
9.50-10.30 Leon Horsten
10.30-11.00 coffee break
11.00-11.30 Filip Buekens
11.30-12.10 general discussion
Workshop description:
Since Horwich (1990) formulated his classic account of truth
minimalism, many have tried to show its limitations: miminalism
couldn't give an account of the normative character of truth (Lynch),
the role of truth axioms (Horsten and Halbach), or the central
function of (the concept of) truth in our cognitive lives (Azzouni).
On the other hand, critics of Minimalism like Davidson and Wiggings
also rejected more substantial theories of truth (correspondence
theories, pragmatic theories) and, in many cases, agreed with the
minimalist that the concept of truth itself was indefinable. This
symposium will explore some recent attempts to steer a middle ground
between minimalist an substantial accounts of truth.
Metaphysics and Its Methods
organised by Arianna Betti (VU University Amsterdam)
Speakers
Arianna Betti (VU University Amsterdam): Of Words and Facts - On the Use and the Role of Linguistic Arguments for Facts in Metaphysics
Andrea Borghini (College of the Holy Cross, USA): General and Particular
Anna-Sofia Maurin (University of Lund): Ontology as a tool
Daniel Nolan (University of Nottingham):
The A Posteriori Armchair
Day 4, August 24th, Building C (Auditorium Maximum), Medium Lecture-Hall B
Timetable:
9.20-10.10 Daniel Nolan
10.10-10.40 discussion
10.40-11.10 coffee break
11.10-12.00 Arianna Betti
12.00-12.30 discussion
12.30-14.40 lunch break
14.40-15.30 Anna-Sofia Maurin
15.30-16.00 discussion
16.00-16.30 coffee break
16.30-17.20 Andrea Borghini
17.20-17.50 discussion
17.50-18.20 general discussion
Workshop Description:
In contrast with traditional analytic philosophy, recent work in analytic
metaphysics shows dissatisfaction with linguistic or semantic arguments for or
against entities. According to the recent trend, in order to argue for or against
some ontological category serious ontological work is needed. If you do
metaphysics, is the punch-line, do metaphysics. Yet as to the best way to
actually do the job, metaphysicians seem to have less punchy lines. What does
serious work in metaphysics look like? Which methods are admissible? For
instance, are semantic arguments never admissible, or are they admissible
under specific constraints? If the latter, which are the criteria that rule such
constraints? And, from a most general point of view, what requirements should
rule theory choice in metaphysics? For instance, should we want to put
naturalism on the list, or is this definitely something that should not be on it? A
less controversial requirement is metaphysical economy. But if the latter is a
matter of choosing premium razors, which brand shall we go for? The
millennia-old requirement of admitting the smallest possible number of
primitive notions is still widely accepted, it seems; but the requirement that our
primitive notions should also be intelligible is a less widely accepted one, or at
least it is much less put into practice. Suppose we agree that intelligibility of
primitive notions is what we should require from a metaphysical theory. Then
what is intelligibility in this sense? Do we know that?
The papers presented at this workshop will explore a number of these questions, either by discussing them in a direct way, by criticising metaphysical practices from a methodological perspective, or by implementing desirable methodological requirements in practice while keeping an explicit meta-perspective on them.
Kinds of Value and Kinds of Value Bearers
organised by Kevin Mulligan (University of Geneva) and Wlodek Rabinowicz (Lund University)
Speakers
Johan Brännmark (Lund University): Goodness, Values, Reasons
Jonas Olson (Oxford University): Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value and the Partiality Challenge
Christian Piller (York University): Valuing Means and Valuing Knowledge
Andrew Reisner (McGill University) Abandoning the Buck Passing Analysis of Final Value
Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (Lund University): On For Someone's Sake Attitudes
Michael Zimmerman (University of North Carolina at Greensboro): Understanding what’s good for us
Day 4, August 24th, Building C (Auditorium Maximum), Large Lecture-Hall A
Tiemetable:
Morning session: Person-relative goodness, personal values
9.30-10.30 Jonas Olson
10.30-11.00 coffee break
11.00 -12.00 Toni Rönnow-Rasmussen
12.00 -13.00 Michael Zimmerman
Afternoon session: Value of knowledge, criticisms of the buck-passing account
14.30-15.30 Christian Piller
15.30-16.30 Johan Brännmark
16.30-17.00 coffee break
17.00-18.00 Andrew Reisner
Workshop description:
Discussions about values are common in many contexts. Often, what is debated is the choice of means to realize or protect certain values, but sometimes the discussion concerns the very values that are to be realized or protected. Philosophical debate in this area has mainly been focused on two kinds of issues. Philosophers have tried to identify the set of fundamental values, i.e., to provide what might be called a substantive axiology, but they have also aimed to clarify the general conceptual framework for thought about values. This latter area can in turn be subdivided into two relatively independent fields of research. In one, we find theories about the meaning, the evidential grounds and the truth status of value claims, along with analyses of the alleged experience of value and the motivational pull of value experiences and value judgments. In the other research field, which may be called formal axiology, the focus is on the structural features of values: on the logic of value, problems of measurement, the conceptual distinctions and connections between different value types, the relationships between value concepts and normative notions (such as 'ought', 'rights', 'obligations', 'duties' and 'reasons'), etc. This workshop aims to concentrate on formal axiology, but other questions concerning value may come to be broached as well.
In particular, the workshop will focus on two sub-areas of formal axiology:
- Kinds of value. Axiologists and others often distinguish between intrinsic versus extrinsic value, basic versus derived value, final versus instrumental value, value for a person (or a group) and value period. There are aesthetic values, ethical values, epistemic values, values in terms of which personal welfare is to be measured and understood, and many more. How are these kinds of values to be distinguished? How are they related? And how can one balance such different values against each other in situations of conflict? Can the valuations made from different perspectives (ethical, esthetical, prudential, etc) be pooled together in a judgment of value ‘all things considered’? And if not, what are the implications of this absence of an Archimedean point for comparisons? What consequences would this have for our decision making?
- Kinds of value bearers: What kinds of objects can be bearers of value? Candidates include persons, things, actions, psychological states such as knowledge and pleasure, character traits, social systems, states of affairs, facts, etc. Both concrete and abstract entities appear to be value apt. Is it the case that, at bottom, only one sort of item can have value, or can more than one sort of item have value? If monists are right, and the ultimate value bearers can be found only in one domain, say, in the area of facts, then how can one account for judgements that ascribe value to non-facts? Is there a way of reducing all such judgements to claims about the ultimate value bearers? On the other hand, if pluralists are right, what meaning can there be in aggregating and comparing value, if its bearers belong to fundamentally different ontological categories? Obviously, however, such aggregation and comparison are of fundamental importance in practical contexts, when it comes to making reasoned choices.